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NOTES & COMMENTS
BEATING THE ODDS: GREATER NEW ORLEANS
BROADCASTING ASSOCIATION v. UNITED STATES
STRIKES CONGRESSIONAL BAN ON COMMERCIAL
SPEECH ADVERTISEMENTS OF PRIVATE CASINO
GAMBLING
I. INTRODUCTION

"Old ideas die hard."'

This proved to be the case in Greater New

Orleans BroadcastingAss 'n v. United States2 when the Supreme Court, in
a unanimous decision, recognized the importance of commercial speech
protection under the First Amendment. In this case, the Court reviewed an
allegation made by the Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association and
a group of other television and radio stations licensed in New Orleans
(collectively, "the Broadcasters").4 The Broadcasters claimed the Federal
Communications Act 5 unconstitutionally infringed upon their right to
broadcast private casino gambling advertisements. 6 Despite the fact that
private casino gambling was legal in New Orleans, the Broadcasters were
prohibited from broadcasting advertisements that promoted gambling
activity under the Federal Communications Act.7 Because this severely
limited the Broadcasters' freedom of speech, they challenged the
Congressional Act as an infringement on their First Amendment rights.8
The GreaterNew Orleans Court issued a pro-commercial speech decision.
The Court found that "respondents cannot overcome the presumption that
the speaker and the audience, not the Government, should be left to assess
1. Wendy Melillo, SpiritedDebate, ADWEEK, Sept. 6, 1999, at 20.
2. 527 U.S. ___ 119 S. Ct. 1923 (1999).
3. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. _,
119 S. Ct. 1923
(1999).
4. See id.
5. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064, 1088 (1934) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1994)).
6. See generally GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S. Ct. 1923.
7. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S. Ct. 1923; 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1994).
8. See id.
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the value of accurate and non-misleading information about lawful
conduct." 9
The Court's decision struck down the sixty-five year old Federal
Communications Act'0 as it applied to casino broadcast advertisements in
states where gambling was legal."
The impact this Supreme Court
decision has had on casino advertising, both in states where private casino
gambling is legal and in states where such gambling is illegal, has been
substantial. 12
Although commercial speech has historically been less protected than
non-commercial speech, the exact level of judicial scrutiny applied to
commercial speech regulation has been unclear. 13 In Central Hudson Gas
& Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,14 the Supreme Court
developed a four-prong analysis for determining, on a case by case basis,
whether a commercial speech regulation violates the First Amendment.15
This Note discusses how the CentralHudson test has been applied in
the past, and how the current Supreme Court construed the test in favor of
commercial speech protection in GreaterNew Orleans BroadcastingAss 'n
v. United States.'6 This Note analyzes how the Supreme Court properly
applied the Central Hudson test to strike down the 1934 Federal
Communications Act as it applied to the Broadcasters that are located in
states where gambling is legal. 1 7 Further, this Note discusses how the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") and the Justice Department8
interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Greater New Orleans.'
9. See id. at 1935 (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993)).
10. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064, 1088 (1934) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1994)).
11. See generally GreaterNew OrleansBroad., 119 S. Ct. 1923.
12. See Robert L. Sharpe, Gambling Ads Legal Despite Gambling Bans, 157 N.J. L.J. 633,
633 (1999) (citing Players Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 988 F. Supp. 497 (D.N.J. 1997)). The
Justice Department and the Federal Communications Commission filed a brief stating they would
no longer defend challenges made by broadcasters in regards to the unconstitutionality of
Congressional prohibitions of private casino gambling advertisements in states where such
gambling is illegal. See id.; see also Greg Stohr, Casino Free to Air Ads, LAS VEGAS REV. J.,
Aug. 10, 1999, at ID ("The Justice Department Monday said it would no longer enforce the
advertising ban anywhere in the country.").
13. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980); see also Dana M. Shelton, Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association v. United
States: The Fifth Circuit Upholds the Federal Ban on Casino Gambling Advertising Against a
FirstAmendment Challenge, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1725, 1725 (1996).
14. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
15. See id. at 566.
16. 119 S. Ct. 1923.

17. Seeid.
18. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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Finally, this Note argues, although the Supreme Court strictly applied the
Central Hudson test, the Court should have gone one step further and
rejected it altogether. Rejecting the CentralHudson test would be a step in
the right direction for affording the same level of First Amendment
protection to commercial and non-commercial speech.
II.BACKGROUND

Although courts have grappled over the proper standard of review for
commercial speech regulations, they agree commercial speech enjoys less
First Amendment protection than non-commercial speech.' 9 One rationale
for this lesser protection is commercial speech is not essential to a
democratic society.20 Commercial speech is economically motivated and
does not offer alternative political views. 21 As a result, it is typically
viewed as though it is less valuable than political speech.22
Commercial speech was first acknowledged as protected speech in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council.23 In that case, the Court realized commercial speech should be
protected because it fosters an indispensable part of the democratic market
economy.24 The Court stated:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it may seem, is
nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing
and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price. So
long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy,
the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made
through numerous private economic decisions.25
While the Virginia State Board Court realized the state has the power
to consistently regulate conduct within the U.S. market economy,26 it also

19. See Shelton, supra note 13, at 1726.
20. See id.
21. See generally Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 561 (stating commercial speech is "expression related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience").
22. See id.
23. See 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976).
24. Virginia State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
765 (1976) ("[Ihf [the free flow of communication] is indispensable to the proper allocation of
resources in a free enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent
opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered.").

25. Id.
26. See id. at 770 ("Virginia is free to require whatever professional standards it wishes of
its pharmacists; it may subsidize them or protect them from competition in other ways. But it
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recognized courts should afford more protection to speech regarding
conduct. 7 Thus, the Court held speech related to marketplace services
cannot be regulated to the same extent as activities and services.28
After Virginia State Board recognized First Amendment protection of
commercial speech, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify how
regulations of commercial speech should be reviewed.2 9 In Central
Hudson, the Supreme Court created a balancing test to determine the
proper degree of protection commercial speech should be afforded under
the First Amendment. 30 Although courts have repeatedly used the Central
Hudson test to rule on commercial speech issues, 31 the application of the
test has continually changed.32
A. The Development of the FourProng Central Hudson Test
The Central Hudson Court developed a four-prong test to determine
whether commercial speech regulations violate the First Amendment.33 In
CentralHudson, the Supreme Court struck down a state law mandating all
New York electric utility companies to cease the production of
advertisements that promote the use of electricity. 34 The Court conducted a
four-part analysis and held the state law was over-inclusive, and thus
unconstitutional.35
The first prong of the Central Hudson test questions whether the
regulated speech concerns lawful activity and is non-misleading.36 If the
commercial speech concerns unlawful activity or is misleading, it is not
protected under the First Amendment.37 However, if the regulated
may not do so by keeping the public in ignorance of the entirely lawful terms that competing
pharmacists are offering." (citation omitted)).
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
30. See generally id. (The four prongs of the CentralHudson test are: 1) the speech must
be lawful and not misleading; 2) the regulation must advance a substantial governmental interest;
3) the regulation must directly advance that interest; and 4) the challenged regulation must be no
more extensive than necessary).
31. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. _, 119 S.Ct.
1923, 1930 (1999) (stating the Supreme Court uses the CentralHudson test to review commercial
speech regulations).
32. See infra Part II.A.-D.
33. See generally CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (creating a four-part test to strike down
the advertisement ban placed on electrical utility companies).
34. See id. at 570.
35. See id. at 566.
36. See id.
37. See id.
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commercial speech concerns lawful activity, and is non-misleading, the
regulation is upheld provided it satisfies the remaining three prongs.38
The second prong of the Central Hudson test requires any regulation
of commercial speech concerning lawful activity that is non-misleading
furthers a substantial governmental interest. 39 Prong three mandates a
commercial speech regulation directly advance that interest. 40 Finally,
prong four requires the challenged law be no41more extensive than necessary
to serve a substantial governmental interest.
The Central Hudson Court reviewed the regulation imposed on
advertising that promoted the use of electricity and held the regulation met
the first three prongs of the test. 42 Therefore, the Court focused its analysis
on the fourth prong.4 3 According to the Court, the advertising ban failed
the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test-the law be no more extensive
than necessary to serve the asserted substantial governmental interestbecause it "suppress[ed] speech that in no way impair[ed] the State's
interest in energy conservation...."" Specifically, the Court found the
advertising regulation prohibited all promotional advertising of energy
use. 4 5 Therefore, although the regulation had an important goal of
decreasing energy consumption, the Court could not justify suppressing
information that would not increase total energy use.46 In its decision, the
CentralHudson Court used heightened scrutiny when it applied prong four,
thereby furthering First Amendment protection of commercial speech.4 7

38. See id.
39. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 567-69.
43. See id. (holding 1) the speech was lawful and non-misleading; 2) the state had a
substantial interest in prohibiting the advertising; and 3) the asserted interest was directly
advanced by the ban). The Court also found the two governmental interests asserted by the
commission, energy conservation and the promotion of fair and efficient utility rates, were
substantial. See id. at 568-69. Finally, the Court held the link between the promotion of fair and
efficient energy rates and the regulation was tenuous, but the link between the asserted interest in
energy conservation and the regulation was directly related. See id. at 569. Thus, there was a
direct link, and prong three was satisfied. See id.
44. Central Hudson, 441 U.S. at 570 (stating the regulation applies to all advertising that
promotes use of electrical utilities, regardless of impact). The Court acknowledged the regulation
applied to uses that would have had no effect on total use, and therefore, the state failed to show a
lesser restriction would serve the state's asserted substantial interests. See id.
45. See CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 570.
46. See id.
47. See id. (noting the state failed to show how a lesser restriction would not have
adequately served the asserted interests).
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B. Central Hudson Begins as a Broad DeferentialAnalysis, Unfavorable to
Commercial Speech
While Central Hudson generally marked a victory for commercial
speech, some courts subsequently applied the CentralHudson test broadly,
allowing legislatures to regulate commercial advertising of certain
activities. In Posadasde Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto
Rico, 48 the Supreme Court deferred to the legislature when it reviewed a
law that regulated casino gambling advertisements. 49 The Court concluded
gambling can be banned completely because it is a "vice activity." 50
Further, the Posadas Court used a "greater includes the lesser" rationale,
reasoning the "power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily
include[s] the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling ....
In Posadas, the Court applied the second and third prongs of the
CentralHudson test and subsequently upheld a state statute prohibiting the
advertisement of legalized casino gambling directed at Puerto Rican
citizens.52 The Posadas Court deferred to the Puerto Rican legislature's
reasoning that the ban was necessary to protect local citizens from immoral
activities, crime, prostitution and corruption, all of which the legislature
believed to be a product of casino gambling.5 3
The Posadas Court applied the second prong of the Central Hudson
test 54 so as to give the legislature power when it regulated commercial
speech. 55 The Court held the Puerto Rican legislature was furthering a
substantial interest in protecting the health, safety and welfare of its
citizens by instituting a ban on casino gambling.56 The Court merely

48. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
49. See generally Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 346-48
(1986) (noting casino gambling is a socially harmful evil and holding a ban on casino gambling
advertisements is constitutional under the First Amendment).
50. Id. at 346.

51. Id. at 345-46 (explaining the "greater includes the lesser" rationale, which instructs if
the government has the power to completely ban an activity, it certainly has the power to ban
speech related to that activity as well).
52. See id. at 345-48.
53. See id. at 341-42.
54. CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 566. The second prong of the CentralHudson test requires
that a commercial speech regulation furthers a substantial governmental interest. See id.
55. See Posadas,478 U.S. at 341-42.
56. See id. The Court quoted the Tourism Company's brief, which stated:
[E]xcessive casino gambling among local residents ... would produce serious
harmful effects on the health, safety and welfare of the Puerto Rican citizens, such
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governmental purpose as
accepted the Puerto Rican legislature's proposed
7
substantial, without any further inquiry.
Under the third prong of the Central Hudson test, 58 the Posadas
Court's analysis proved to be similarly deferential.5 9 The Court conceded it
was reasonable for the Puerto Rican legislature to believe such regulation
would directly serve the substantial governmental purpose of protecting
citizens from the evils related to gambling.60 Under the third prong, the
regulation was challenged as underinclusive because the regulation
prohibited the advertisement of only one specific type of chance game,
casino gambling, but permitted the advertisement of various other types of
chance games. 6 The Court once again deferred to the legislature and
found it was reasonable to believe casino games were more dangerous to
the welfare of Puerto Ricans than other chance games.62 The Court
reasoned this relative danger justified the regulation's underinclusive
character.63
Finally, under the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test, 64 the
Posadas Court held the restriction on advertisements was no more
extensive than necessary to serve the government's interest. 65 The Court
found the advertisement ban was narrowly tailored because it applied only
to advertisements directed at Puerto Rican residents and because the ban

as the disruption of moral and cultural patterns, the increase in local crime, the
fostering of prostitution, the development of corruption, and the infiltration of
organized crime.

Id.
57. See id. at 341 (holding the Puerto Rican legislature's asserted interest constituted a
substantial governmental interest without further exploring the way gambling affects the health,
safety and welfare of citizens).
58. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. Prong three requires the commercial speech
regulation directly advance the asserted substantial governmental interest. See id.
59. See Posadas,478 U.S. at 341-42.
The Puerto Rican Legislature obviously believed, when it enacted the advertising
restrictions at issue here, that advertising of casino gambling aimed at the residents
of Puerto Rico would serve to increase the demand for the product advertised...
Central Hudson would not contest the advertising ban unless it believed that
promotion would increase its sales.
Id. (quoting CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 569).
60. See id.
61. See id. at 342 (noting horse racing, cockfighting and the lottery may be advertised to the
residents of Puerto Rico).
62. See id. at 342-43.
63. See id. at 343.
64. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. The fourth prong of the Central Hudson test
requires the challenged law be no more extensive than necessary to serve the asserted substantial
governmental interest. See id.
65. See Posadas,478 U.S. at 343.
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was instituted in order to protect the residents from dangers associated with
casino gambling.6 6 Once again, using a deferential approach,67 the Court
did not seek empirical evidence or proof the ban had no effect on
advertisements that targeted tourists visiting Puerto Rico.68
C. The Supreme Court Narrows the Central Hudson Test
Seven years after Posadas, the Supreme Court narrowed the Central
Hudson test by putting an end to its previous approach.6 9 In Edenfield v.
Fane,70 the court demanded empirical proof the commercial speech
regulation directly advanced the asserted governmental interest under
prongs two and three. In addition, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,71 the
Court was responsive to an allegation that the regulation at issue was
overinclusive under prong four.7 2
Under the third prong of the CentralHudson test, the Edenfield Court
struck down a state law that banned business solicitations by certified
public accountants.7 3 The Court stated satisfying the third prong of the
CentralHudson test necessitates a showing of more than ineffectiveness or
remote support for the proposed substantial purpose.74 In effect, the Court
narrowed the third prong of the Central Hudson test by requiring the party
seeking to uphold the restriction on commercial speech provide empirical
evidence to show that the commercial speech regulation directly advances
the asserted governmental interest. 75 The Court explained under Central
Hudson's third prong, the regulating body must demonstrate the
commercial speech restriction would prevent foreseeable harm to a material
degree.76
Thus, the Edenfield Court asked the Florida Board of

66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id. The Court avoided the issue and stated, "[tihe narrowing constructions of the
advertising restrictions announced by the Superior Court ensure that restrictions will not affect
advertising of casino gambling aimed at tourists, but will apply only to such advertising when
aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico." Id.
69. See id.
70. 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993) (holding to satisfy the Central Hudson test, the government
must prove with empirical evidence that the regulation placed on commercial speech advances a
substantial governmental purpose, and the substantial purpose is directly asserted by the
regulation).
71. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
72. See generally Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
73. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
74. See id.
75. Seeid. at 770-71.
76. Id.

2000]

BEATING THE ODDS

Accountancy to present studies or anecdotal evidence in order to satisfy
this requirement." Ultimately, the law was struck down because the Board
could not meet this burden.78
In Rubin, the Court followed Edenfield's application of the Central
Hudson test 79 when the Supreme Court reviewed the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act,80 which banned the display of alcohol content on beer
labels.8 ' The Rubin Court struck down the Act, finding it violated First
Amendment commercial speech principles.8 2 The government asserted the
purpose of the Act was to prevent beer companies from raising the alcohol
content of their beer products to promote sales.83 The Rubin Court held,
although such an interest was substantial, the regulation failed the third
prong of the Central Hudson test because the government could not
adequately demonstrate the restriction would materially and directly
achieve its asserted purpose.84 The government offered anecdotal evidence
and educated guesses8 5 to demonstrate a direct connection between
prohibiting the display of alcohol content on beer labels and preventing
C&
wars ',86 among beer producers.887 However, the government's
strength
proffered evidence proved insufficient to show this connection. 8 The
Rubin Court required concrete, empirical proof the government's interest
was directly achieved by the regulation, which was more than what the
government offered. 9

77. Id.
78. Id. at 771 (stating "[t]he only suggestion that a ban on solicitation might help prevent
fraud and overreaching or preserve CPA independence is the affidavit of Louis Dooner, which

contains nothing more than a series of conclusory statements that add little if anything to the
Board's original statement of its justifications").
79. See Rubin 514 U.S. at 486-87. ("In Edenfield, we decided that the Government carries
the burden of showing that the challenged regulation advances the Government's interest 'in a
direct and material way."').
80. Federal Alcohol Administration Act of 1935 ("FAAA"), § 5(e)(2), 27 U.S.C. §
205(e)(2) (1994).

81. Id.
82. See Rubin, 514 U.S. at 491.
83. See id. at 483-85 (explaining the government argued, pursuant to its twenty-first
Amendment power to regulate alcohol, the regulation was aimed at curbing "strength wars"
among beer producers and would regulate alcohol levels of beverages).

84. See id. at 491.
85. See id. at 490.
86. Id. at 483.

87. See id.
88. See Rubin, 517 U.S. at 490.
89. See id. (rejecting the anecdotal evidence and educated guesses offered by the
government's brief as insufficient evidence, which could not "overcome the irrationality of the
governmental scheme and the weight of the record").
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Further, the Supreme Court in Rubin struck down the ban placed on
beer labeling because, under the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test, it
did not survive the challenge that it was overinclusive. 90 The government
argued the ban was sufficiently tailored because the regulation only applied
to disclosures of alcohol content in labeling and advertising, rather than
prohibiting all alcohol content disclosures. 9' Coors Brewing Company
challenged the regulation and argued there existed alternative, less speechrestrictive means of serving the government's purpose.92 Coors Brewing
Company explained specific restrictions, such as limiting the label ban to
malt liquors, would be less restrictive alternatives available to the
government. 93 Ultimately, the Court agreed and held the ban was more
extensive than necessary to achieve the government's asserted substantial
purpose. 94
Although the Rubin Court did not overrule Posadas, it broadened the
Central Hudson test by distinguishing Posadas95 and held it would not
create an exception to Central Hudson.96 In Rubin the government relied
on the "vice theory" and argued alcohol, like casino gambling in Posadas,
was socially harmful.97 The Court stated this argument was irrelevant
under the CentralHudson four-prong test. This was because the Posadas
Court struck down the regulation under this vice theory only after it had
applied CentralHudson and found the regulation passed all four prongs.98
As a result, the Rubin Court declined to subject laws to a more deferential
standard of review solely because they regulated socially harmful vice
activities.99 Rather, the court chose to review such regulations under
CentralHudson's strict application.' 00 As a result, the Rubin Court struck

90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 490-91 (noting the malt liquor market was a specific segment of the alcohol
market that was involved in the strength war).
94. See Rubin, 517 U.S. at 491 (holding "the availability of these options, all of which could
advance the Government's asserted interest in a manner less intrusive to respondent's First
Amendment rights, indicates that § 205(e)(2) is more extensive than necessary").
95. See id. at 482 & n.2 (explaining although the government urged the Rubin Court to defer
to the legislature because the regulated speech promoted alcohol consumption, the Court
disagreed and strictly applied CentralHudson).
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 482 n.2.
99. See id.
100. See Rubin, 514 U.S. at 482 & n.2.
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down the prohibition
information. 0 1

of beer labels

advertising alcohol

content

D. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island:
Tightening the Central Hudson Test
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island 102 continued the Supreme
Court's trend by narrowing the Central Hudson test in rendering procommercial speech decisions. 10 3 44 Liquormart clearly rejected the
deferential approach and the greater includes the lesser argument used in
Posadas.1' 4 The Court in 44 Liquormart held two state laws banning 0 5
liquor price advertising were unconstitutional, despite the state's argument
the Court should defer to the legislature's judgment in creating these
bans. 10 6 The Court concluded blanket regulations must be reviewed with
special care, as singling out truthful and non-misleading commercial
speech is "particularly dangerous."' 7 The Court was "skeptical of
in the dark for what the government
regulations that seek to keep people
08
perceives to be their own good."'
In the tradition of the Rubin decision, the 44 LiquonnartCourt strictly
applied the third prong of Central Hudson and required a showing of
empirical evidence to prove the ban on advertisements achieved a
substantial government interest. 1 9 The state failed to present empirical
evidence supporting the position that the ban on price advertisements
directly achieved the government's interest in reducing alcohol
consumption." 0 The state's attempts to appeal to common sense were not

101. See id. at 491.
102. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
103. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996). ("The mere fact
that messages propose commercial transactions does not in and of itself dictate the constitutional
analysis that should apply to decisions to suppress them.").

104. See id. at 509-10.
105. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-8-7 (1987) (prohibiting out-of-state and in-state alcohol
manufacturers, distributors and retailers from advertising the price of alcoholic beverages, but
making an exception for price signs or tags accompanying such merchandise); see also R.I. GEN.

LAWS § 3-8-8.1 (1987) (prohibiting Rhode Island news media from publishing or broadcasting
any alcoholic beverage advertisements).
106. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 504 & n.14 (noting the state argued it enacted the
legislation at issue to "reduce consumption among irresponsible drinkers").
107. Id. at 501.
108. Id. at 503.
109. See id. at 505.
110. See id. (citing Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771; Rubin, 514 U.S. at 486-88).
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sufficient.1 1' Thus, the legislature's burden of proof under the third prong
12
continued to be more difficult to meet after the 44 Liquormart decision.'
Additionally, the third prong was narrowed even further in 44 Liquormart
because the Court held a commercial speech regulation must not only
directly advance a governmental interest, but also must significantly
advance such an interest.13
Under the fourth prong of Central Hudson, the Court held it was
"perfectly obvious that alternative forms of regulation that would not
involve any restriction on speech would be more likely to achieve the
State's goal of promoting temperance."' " 14
For example, the state
legislature could ensure prices placed on alcoholic beverages were
maintained at high levels by directly regulating prices or by employing
direct taxation. 15 Accordingly, the Court found
the state regulation failed
6
the fourth prong of the CentralHudson test. 1
More significantly, the 44 Liquormart Court rejected the "greater
includes the lesser" rationale of Posadas.1 7 The state argued the ban on
liquor price advertisements would directly achieve temperance. l 8 In
addition, as in Posadas the state legislature in 44 Liquormart argued
because it had the greater power to ban alcohol consumption, it also had the
greater power to ban speech related to alcohol consumption.11 9 Ultimately
the 44 Liquormart Court disagreed with the state's position, and refused 120
to
defer to the legislature as the Supreme Court had done in Posadas.
Instead, the Court concluded banning speech rather than conduct is "far

111. See id. at 505 (stating "we can agree that common sense supports the conclusion ...
[h]owever without any findings of fact, or indeed any evidentiary support whatsoever, we cannot
agree with the assertion").
112. 44 Liquormart,517 U.S. at 505.
113. See id. at 506 (holding "[a]lthough the record suggests that the price advertising ban
may have some impact on the purchasing patterns of temperate drinkers of modest means ... the
State has presented no evidence to suggest that its speech prohibition will significantly reduce

marketwide consumption").
114. Id. at 507.
115. See id.
116. See id. (finding the state did not demonstrate a reasonable connection between the
regulations at issue and the asserted substantial governmental interest).
117. See id. at 508-13 (holding the deferential standard and the greater includes lesser
argument from Posadasno longer applies when defending against First Amendment challenges to
commercial speech regulations, and is therefore overruled). The greater includes the lesser
rationale refers to the court's reasoning that because a vice activity can be regulated, speech
related to that activity may be regulated as well. See Posadas,478 U.S. at 346.
118. See 44Liquormart,517 U.S. at 508.

119. See id.
120. See id. at 509.
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more intrusive"' 2 1 under First Amendment principles. 22 The Court refused
to follow Posadas and declined to give the Rhode Island legislature the
discretion to
"suppress truthful, nonmisleading information for paternalistic
123
purposes."'

In 44 Liquormart, Rhode Island also asserted the vice activity
argument the Court recognized earlier in Posadas. 24 The government
claimed the legislature should be able to regulate speech related to socially
harmful vice activities more freely than other types of speech. 25 The 44
Liquormart Court noted Rubin did not permit speech about a vice
activity 126 to be regulated as readily as the Posadas Court had. 27 The
Court reasoned any activity harmful to the public could be labeled a vice,
and would thus justify a blanket ban on speech regarding that activity. 28
Accordingly,
the 44 Liquormart Court rejected the Posadas vice activity
29
argument.1
The journey from the Central Hudson's tests inception in 1980,130 to
the 44 LiquormartCourt's interpretation of the test in 1996, is evidence the
Supreme Court has taken a more protective position with regard to
commercial speech,' 3 '
In Posadas, the Court was deferential in its
application of the Central Hudson test, but it applied the test more
stringently in Edenfield and Rubin when it began to second-guess
regulations placed on commercial speech. 32 However, despite stricter
application of the Central Hudson test, the ultimate victory for commercial
speech could only arise if it were given protection, under the First
Amendment, equal to non-commercial speech.

121. Id. at 511.
122. See id.
123. Id. at 510.
124. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 513 (stating Rhode Island asserted "the price
advertising ban should be upheld because it targets commercial speech that pertains to a 'vice'
(category]").
125. See id.at513-14.
126. See id. at 513.
127. See id. at 513-14, (citing Rubin, 514 U.S. at 478-82 & 482 n.2, which did not apply
the Posadas principle that indicates socially harmful, vice activities may be more freely
regulated).
128. See id.
at 515.
129. See id.
130. See generally CentralHudson, 447 U.S. 557 (developing the four-prong test to review

commercial speech regulations).
131. See generally 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. 484.
132. See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770; see also Rubin, 514 U.S. at 490.
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III. GREATER NEW ORLEANS BROADCASTING ASS'N V. UNITED STATES
MAKES ITS WAY THROUGH THE COURTS WITH GREAT IMPACT

The journey Greater New Orleans3 3 made through the court system
exemplifies the great confusion that exists regarding what level of
protection commercial speech should be afforded under the First
Amendment. 34
Ultimately, in Greater New Orleans and Players
International,Inc. v. United States,135 the Supreme Court gave commercial
speech greater protection under the First Amendment. 36 However, these
cases demonstrate "old ideas die hard"'137 because the Supreme Court
maintained different levels of review for commercial and non-commercial
speech regulations. 138 This inconsistency was a direct result of the Court's
failure to overrule CentralHudson.
A. Statement of Facts
Section 1304 of the Federal Communications Act 39 prohibits radio
and television broadcast advertisements for privately run casino gambling
in any state, regardless of whether gambling is legal in the state in which
the broadcaster is licensed." 4° However, this ban has been subject to many
exceptions.' 4' For instance, non-profit activities, such as state-conducted
lotteries 142 and Indian gaming, 143 are exempt from § 1304.144 Therefore,
these activities may be freely advertised without violating the Act. 145
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association was a radio and
television broadcasting company, licensed in Louisiana, a state where
private casino gambling was legal. 146 Greater New Orleans Broadcasting
Association, for fear of criminal prosecution, refrained from broadcasting

133. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 1923
(1999).
134. See infra Part III.B.
135. 988 F. Supp. 497 (D.N.J. 1997).
136. See generally GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1923.
137. See Melillo, supra note 1, at 20.
138. See id.
139. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064, 1088 (1934)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1994)).
140. 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1994).
141. See 18 U.S.C.§§ 1305-1307 (1994).
142. See id. § 1307.
143. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1211(c)(3) (1998).
144. 18 U.S.C. § 1304.
145. Id.
146. See Shelton, supra note 13, at 1725.
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private casino gambling advertisements in Louisiana and Mississippi, even
though such gambling was legal in those states.1 47 Because the Greater
New Orleans Broadcasting Association and a group of New Orleans-based
television and radio stations (collectively, "the Broadcasters") wanted to
freely advertise private casino gambling they 48 challenged § 1304 as an
unconstitutional commercial speech regulation.1
B. ProceduralHistory: To the Supreme Court and Back Again
The Broadcasters' challenge to § 1304 was rigorous, lengthy and
ultimately victorious. 149 The Broadcasters initially met unfavorable results
in both the Louisiana District Court1 50 and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 151 After the Broadcasters petitioned the
Supreme Court for review, the Court granted certiorari, vacated the
judgment and remanded the case, in light of 44 Liquormart.152 When the
Supreme Court heard the Broadcasters' claim for the second
time, it
53
interpreted CentralHudson in favor of commercial speech.
1. The Broadcasters' First Journey to the Supreme Court Received
Unfavorable Results for Commercial Speech
The Broadcasters filed suit in a Louisiana District Court hoping the
54
Court would decide in their case, § 1304 violated the First Amendment.
In granting the government a motion for summary judgment, the Court held
the statute was constitutional. 55 The district court held under § 1304, the
Broadcasters could broadcast advertisements about non-gambling related
activities, such as food services, that occur within casinos. 5 6 Furthermore,
it held the Broadcasters could advertise the types of gambling that fell

147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See infra Part III.B. 1-2.
150. See generally Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 975
(E.D. La. 1994) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 1034).
151. See generally Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 69 F.3d 1296 (5th
Cir. 1995), aff'g 866 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. La. 1994) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 1304).
152. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 519 U.S. 801 (1996) (cert.
granted,judgment vacated,and case remanded).
153. See Greater New Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1923 (striking down 18 U.S.C. § 1304 as it
applied to the Broadcasters).
154. See GreaterNew Orleans,866 F. Supp. at 975-76.
155. See id. at 976.
156. See id. at 980.
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under the statute's exemptions. 57 Nevertheless,
the Broadcasters still
8
could not advertise actual gambling activities.15
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found the
159
statute was not an unconstitutional restriction under Central Hudson.
60
The Fifth Circuit relied on Posadas,1
and upheld § 1304 as applied to the
16
Broadcasters.'
Dissatisfied, the Broadcasters then filed a petition to the
62

Supreme Court'

While this petition was pending, a plurality of the Supreme Court
63
Because the 44 Liquonnart decision changed
decided 44 Liquormart.1

the application of the Central Hudson test, 164 the Supreme Court granted
the Broadcasters' petition for review.165 The Supreme Court noted the third
prong of the Central Hudson test was more difficult to satisfy under 44
Liquormart,166 vacated the decision and remanded the suit to the Fifth
67

Circuit. 1

On remand, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the Broadcasters' claims in
light of the 44 Liquormartdecision, reaffirming the district court's decision
by upholding § 1304 as it applied to the Broadcasters. 68 The Fifth Circuit
practically ignored the 44 Liquormart decision when it deferred to the
legislature under the third prong of the Central Hudson test.' 69 The Court

found § 1304 advanced the government's interest to a greater extent than
the regulation in 44 Liquormart170 In doing so, the Fifth Circuit failed to

157. See id.
158. See id. ('The plaintiffs acknowledge that under certain circumstances it is entirely
lawful to broadcast casino advertisements. However, advertisements must pertain to the casino's
amenities, such as food and rooms.").
159. See GreaterNew Orleans, 69 F.3d at 1302.
160. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
161. See GreaterNew Orleans, 69 F.3d at 1302 (stating the regulation directly advanced the
asserted governmental interest and the regulation was no more restrictive than necessary).
162. See GreaterNew Orleans, 519 U.S. at 801.
163. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). See supra notes 86-108 and
accompanying text; see also Case Comment, First Amendment - Commercial Speech - Fifth
Circuit Upholds a FederalBan on Casino Advertising, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1112, 1112 (1999).
164. See Case Comment, supranote 163, at 1112.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 1113.
167. See GreaterNew Orleans, 519 U.S. at 801.
168. See GreaterNew Orleans, 149 F.3d at 334 (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 1304).
169. See id. at 337.
170. See id.
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consider 44 Liquormart had rejected the Posadas Court's deferential
review. 171
2. The Broadcasters' Second Journey to the Supreme Court Receives
Favorable Results for Commercial Speech
On its second appeal to the Supreme Court, the Broadcasters received
favorable results.172 The Supreme Court held § 1304 could not be used to
place a ban on broadcasters who wished to advertise legal, private casino
gambling. 173 The Court174applied the Central Hudson test, focusing on the
third and fourth prongs.
First, the Supreme Court found the government failed to satisfy the
third prong because it failed to show § 1304 directly achieved the
substantial governmental interest of decreasing gambling activity." 7' The
Court reasoned decreasing advertisements would not necessarily decrease
the demand for gambling. 176 The Court indicated this might instead merely
channel gamblers to advertised casinos. 77 Therefore, because it was not
proven § 1304 decreased the demand for private casino gambling,
the
178
down.
struck
ultimately
was
and
prong
third
the
failed
regulation
In addition, the Supreme Court held the exemptions under § 1304
made the government's case extremely weak under the third prong of the
Central Hudson test. 179 For example, Indian gaming advertisements and
broadcasts that referred to the "Vegas style excitement" within private
casinos were exempt from § 1304.180 According to the Court, these holes
and inconsistencies were at odds with the government's interest in

171. See generally Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 149 F,3d 334 (5th
Cit. 1998); see also Case Comment, supra note 163, at 1115 ("[I]n particular, 44 Liquormart
embraced a heightened protection of commercial speech and rejected several lines of reasoning
first articulated in Posadasde Puerto Rico Ass 'n v. Tourism Co. The Greater New Orleans Court
ignored both of these doctrinal shifts.").
172. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1923.
173. See id. at 1926.
174. See supra notes 161-168 and accompanying text.
175. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1933 ("[A]s the Court of Appeals recognized,
the Government fails to 'connect casino gambling and compulsive gambling with broadcast

advertisement for casinos'-let alone broadcast advertising for non-Indian commercial casinos.").
176. See id. at 1932-33.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id. at 1933.
180. See id. (stating "[w]e can hardly fault the FCC in view of the statute's focus on the
suppression of certain types of information, the agency's practice is squarely at odds with the
governmental interests asserted in this case").
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exterminating the social ills of gambling.'8 ' Therefore, the Court held the
"interpretation and application of § 1304... underscore[d] the statute's
infirmity."'' 82 Here, the Court strictly analyzed § 1304 under the third
prong of the Central Hudson test by looking beyond the text of the
statute.183
Because § 1304 was overbroad, the Supreme Court held the
government also failed to satisfy the fourth prong of the Central Hudson
test. 84 The Court noted the government's argument that Indian gaming85
was exempt from § 1304 because it was a highly regulated area.1
Therefore, the Court required Congress consider comparable regulations on
private casino gambling, similar to those placed on Indian casino gaming
86
activities, before regulating speech related to private casino gambling.
The Supreme Court's Greater New Orleans opinion was consistent
with the 44 Liquormart Court's decision that the government's right to
prohibit conduct does not necessarily give the government the right to
prohibit speech regarding that conduct.187 Although it may be within
reason for the government to regulate private casinos more extensively than
Indian casinos, this does not mean it is also within reason for the
government to limit private casino
advertisements to a greater extent than
88
advertisements.1
casino
Indian
The Supreme Court closely scrutinized § 1304 and the government's
motivation for enacting the regulation under the third and fourth prongs of

181. GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1933 (citation omitted).
182. Id. at 1933.
183. See id.
184. See generally id. at 1933-35.
185. See id. at 1934 (noting "[i]ronically, the most significant difference identified by the
Government between tribal and other classes of casino gambling is that the former are 'heavily
regulated'). Furthermore, "the Government cites revenue needs of States and tribes that conduct
casino gambling, and notes that net revenues generated by the tribal casinos are dedicated to the
welfare of the tribes and their members." Id.
186. See id.
If such direct regulation provides a basis for believing that the social costs of
gambling in tribal casinos are sufficiently mitigated to make their advertising
tolerable, one would have thought that Congress might have at least experimented
with comparable regulation before abridging the speech rights of federally
un regulated casinos.
Id.
187. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1934 (citing 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 50911).
188. See id. at 1934. The Court recognized "there may be valid reasons for imposing
commercial regulations on non-Indian businesses that differ from those imposed on tribal
enterprises. It does not follow, however, that those differences also justify abridging non-Indians'
freedom of speech more severely than the freedom of their tribal competitors." Id.
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the CentralHudson test. 89 The Court actively reached outside the bounds
of § 1304 and compared § 1304 to Congress' treatment of speech relating
to Indian casino gaming.' 90 However, the Supreme Court's decision in
GreaterNew Orleans did not complete the victory for commercial speech
protection under the First Amendment.' 9'
The greatest victory for
commercial
speech
came
in
the
aftermath
of
this
landmark Supreme Court
192
decision.
C. Greater New Orleans GreatlyImpacted Broadcastsfor PrivateCasino
Gambling
Greater New Orleans created vast implications for broadcasters
because it held broadcasters licensed in states where private casino
gambling was legal could broadcast their advertisements without fear of
prosecution. 193 However, the Court failed to indicate whether § 1304 could
apply to broadcasters licensed in states where private casinos were
illegal. 194 In effect, the FCC took advantage of this decision by narrowly
interpreting GreaterNew Orleans to ensure § 1304 would survive. 195 After
GreaterNew Orleans, the FCC warned these broadcasters they would be
sanctioned196if they broadcast advertisements promoting private casino
gambling.
Many legal commentators argued the GreaterNew Orleans decision
should be read to apply to all states regardless of the fact that various
broadcasters were located in the twenty-two states where gambling was
illegal. 97 They argued, if the FCC adopted regulations that clearly struck
down § 1304 in all jurisdictions, vast amounts of litigation could be
189. See id. at 1932-35.
190. See id. at 1934-35.

191. See infra Part III.C.
192. See infra Part IH.C.
193. See David S. Savage, High Court Trims Ban on Gambling Ad Broadcasts, L.A. TIMES,
June 15, 1999, at A12.
[B]roadcasters in the New Orleans area now have the right to carry ads promoting
gambling in private casinos in Louisiana 'where such gambling is legal,' the court
said. This frees radio and television broadcasters in 10 other states, including
Nevada and New Jersey, to advertise casino gambling because private casinos
operate lawfully in those jurisdictions.
Id.; see also Robert L. Sharpe, supra note 12, at 633 (stating "[n]ow casinos gave the opportunity
to advertise their product the same as any other business").
194. See David 0. Stewart, Casino Ad Ban Goes Bust Louisiana BroadcastersPrevail on
FirstAmendment Grounds, LEGAL TIMEs, July 12, 1999, at S34.
195. See Stewart, supranote 193, at S34.

196. See id.
197. See id.
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avoided. 198 Although commentators focused on the fact that the Supreme
Court found § 1304 to unconstitutionally infringe on free speech under
CentralHudson,'99 a literal reading of the opinion demonstrates the Court
did not strike down the regulation in its entirety.° 0
On August 6, 1999, the government, in response to Greater New
Orleans, filed a supplemental brief in the Third Circuit where a suit,
Players International,Inc. v. United States,20 ' was pending appeal.20 2 The
government's brief stated it would not defend suits like Player's
International,which argued § 1304 should apply to broadcasts of casino
gambling advertisements in states where private casino gambling was
illegal.20 3
In Players International, Players International and several other
petitioners filed suit to challenge § 1304 as it applied to them.2 °4
Petitioners were broadcasters located near, but not actually in, a state where
private casino gambling was legal. 20 5 Due to the pressures the government
felt after the Supreme Court decision in GreaterNew Orleans, it stated it
would allow broadcasters like Players International to broadcast truthful,
non-misleading casino gambling advertisements.2 6 This resulted in wider
protection for commercial speech.2 °7
IV. GREATER NEW ORLEANS RESULTED IN GREAT STRIDES FOR
COMMERCIAL SPEECH PROTECTION BUT FAILED TO REJECT CENTRAL
HUDSON
Greater New Orleans properly incorporated pro-commercial speech
principles advanced by 44 Liquormart, but failed to directly clarify the
application and status of the CentralHudson test.20 8 After 44 Liquormart,
commentators suggested the Central Hudson test was "ripe for

198. See id.

199. See id.
200. See Savage, supra note 191, at A12.
201. 988 F. Supp. 497 (D.N.J. 1999).
202. See Sharpe, supra note 12 and accompanying text.

203. See id.
204. See Robert L. Sharpe, Gambling Ads Legal Despite Gambling Bans, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 12, 1999, at 3.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 4.

207. See id.
208. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S.____ 119 S.Ct. 1923,
1930 (1999); see also infra Part I.B.
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rejection., 20 9 However, the Supreme Court avoided this question in
GreaterNew Orleans, leaving the CentralHudson test technically intact.2 10
A. Greater New Orleans Court ClarifiedProng Three of Central Hudson
Emphasizing 44 Liquormart'ssignificant tightening of the third prong
of the CentralHudson test, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's
deferential review under this prong. 21'
From the test's inception,
commercial speech regulation could be upheld under the third prong of
Central Hudson only if it directly advanced the asserted governmental
interest.212 The Fifth Circuit deferred to the state claiming the level 213
of
Liquormart.
44
after
unclear
left
was
three
prong
under
required
proof
However, the Fifth Circuit, in GreaterNew Orleans, improperly interpreted
44 Liquormart, which made the third prong of the Central Hudson test
substantially more difficult to satisfy.21 4
44 Liquormart held a regulation banning speech must significantly
advance an asserted governmental interest under the third prong.21 5 In
addition, the relationship between the regulation and the interest had to be
scrutinized in favor of protecting commercial speech.2 16
The 44
Liquormart court also required evidence and factual findings to show the
regulation advanced the interest to a material degree.217
Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court in GreaterNew Orleans
followed 44 Liquormart and tightened the third prong.218 It quoted the
21 9
Rubin Court, which indicated prong three was "a critical requirement.,
209. Marrie K. Stone, The PriceIsn't Right: 44 Liquormart,Inc. v. Rhode Island Promotes
Free Speech in CommercialAdvertising, 18 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 133, 162 (1997).
210. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S.Ct. at 1930.
211. See id.
212. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
213. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 149 F.3d 334, 337 (5th Cir. 1998).
"[I]f the government's burden were to establish a direct, quantitative evidentiary link among these
phenomena, we do not believe it has done so. But 44 Liquormart,though more demanding on the
fourth prong of Central Hudson, does not appear to establish an insurmountable test." Id. at 339.
214. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505 (1996) (stating "[t]he need
for the State to make such a showing is particularly great given the drastic nature of its chosen
means-the wholesale suppression of truthful, non-misleading information").
215. See id. at 507.

216. See id. (indicating "the State has presented no evidence to suggest that the speech
prohibition will significantly reduce marketwide consumption"); see also id. at 505 (holding "the
state bears the burden to show that the regulation advanced its interest to a material degree"
(quoting Edenfield v. Scott Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993)).
217. See 44Liquormart,517 U.S. at 505.
218. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S.Ct. at 1932.
219. See id.
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Furthermore, the Court noted, if heightened scrutiny was not applied to
prong three, the government could easily restrict commercial speech for
hidden purposes that did not justify burdening commercial speech. 220 The
Court then looked closely at whether the state had met its burden of
showing restricting commercial speech of casino gambling activities
directly advanced the substantial interest of eliminating social ills. 22' The

Court decided, while it was reasonable to simply assume such a burden had
been met, it would require more than mere assumptions. 22 Consequently,
this application correctly incorporated both 44 Liquormartand Rubin. 23
Greater New Orleans held the "significant advancement" required
under the third prong of the CentralHudson test called for much more than
mere deference or conjecture. 24 Rather, it found an analysis under the

third

prong

called

for

actual

proof

and

empirical

evidence.22 5

Consequently, Greater New Orleans strengthened the third prong of the

Central Hudson test 22 6 in that it was no longer a toothless test through
which commercial speech regulations could pass without regard for First
Amendment principles.
B. Greater New Orleans Court ClarifiedProngFour ofCentral Hudson
When 44 Liquormart strictly applied the fourth prong of the Central
Hudson test, it became highly probable very few regulations would pass
Central Hudson in the future. 227
Ultimately, less speech-restrictive

alternatives would foreseeably be available to meet any substantial state

220. See id. (quoting Rubin, 514 U.S. at 487).
221. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1932. The government argued the ban would
decrease the quantity of gamblers, which in turn would decrease the social costs associated with
casino gambling. See id.
222. See id. at 1933-35.
223. See generally 44 Liquornart,517 U.S. 484; Rubin, 514 U.S. 476 (explaining the 44
Liquormart and the Rubin court both sought evidentiary facts to show the regulations at issue
directly advanced the asserted governmental interest).
224. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1932.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See generally 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501 (stating "as our review of the case law
reveals, Rhode Island errs in concluding that all commercial speech regulations are subject to a
similar form of constitutional review simply because they target a similar category of
expression"). Justice Thomas stated "[b]oth Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor appear to
adopt a stricter, more categorical interpretation of the fourth prong of Central Hudson than that
suggested in some of our other opinions, one that could, as a practical matter, go a long way
toward the position I take." Id. at 524; see also id. at 504 (stating "we must review the price
advertising ban with 'special care"').
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goal. 22' As Justice Thomas predicted in 44 Liquormart, this application of
the fourth prong would strike down virtually all regulations on commercial
speech because "directly banning a product... would virtually always be
at least as effective in discouraging consumption as merely restricting
advertising regarding the product would be, and thus virtually all
restrictions with such a purpose would fail the fourth prong of the Central
Hudson test., 229 Therefore, the plurality's holding in 44 Liquormart
suggested any state regulation of commercial speech would inevitably fail
the fourth prong of the CentralHudson test.23 °
In light of 44 Liquormart, the Court in GreaterNew Orleans applied
the fourth prong of Central Hudson even more strictly than it previously
had.2 3' The Court held, before the government could ban broadcasts of
private casino gambling, Congress had to attempt to use less intrusive, nonspeech related forms of regulation.232 With this step, the Court actively
protected commercial speech and in doing so suggested other means of
curbing the social ills associated with gambling would be necessary.
C. Greater New Orleans AppropriatelyRejected Posadas
In Greater New Orleans, the Supreme Court rejected the Fifth
Circuit's reliance on the greater includes the lesser rationale and the social
evils argument,2 33 both of which originated in the Posadas decision.234 To
the contrary, the Fifth Circuit GreaterNew Orleans court ignored the fact
that 44 Liquormart rejected the Posadas court's reasoning. 235 The Fifth
Circuit held because the state could regulate casino gambling activities,
under the theory that it was a social evil, it could regulate speech related to
casino gambling as well.236 Essentially, this argument denigrated the First

228. See 44 Liquormart,517 U.S. at 507.
229. Id. at 524.
230. See id. at 524-26.
231. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1929.
232. Id. at 1934. "[A] prohibition or supervision of gambling on credit; limitations on the
use of cash machines on casino premises; controls on admissions; pot or betting limits; location
restrictions; and licensing requirements - that could more directly and effectively alleviate some
of the social costs of casino gambling." Id.
233. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S.Ct. at 1929.
234. See generally Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986).

235. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 975, 976 (E.D.
La. 1994).
236. See GreaterNew Orleans, 149 F.3d at 341 (stating if the regulation is unconstitutional,
it will have negative effects on society, but that "[n]o local prohibition of gambling will be
meaningful, and communities will be less capable of insulating themselves and their children
from the deleterious influence of gambling").
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Amendment values of commercial speech that had evolved in 44
Liquormart.2

7

Since Virginia State Board, the Supreme Court has

recognized commercial speech as an indispensable part of a democratic
238
market society, which cannot be regulated as readily as conduct,
Accordingly, in 44 Liquormart,the Court held:
Contrary to the assumption made in Posadas, we think it quite

clear that banning speech may sometimes prove far more
intrusive than banning conduct. As a venerable proverb teaches,
it may prove more injurious to prevent people from teaching
others how to fish than to prevent fish from being sold. 239

In completely rejecting the Posadas court's anti-First Amendment
principles and deferential review, and in affirming the speech protective
principles of 44 Liquormart, the GreaterNew Orleans court took another

step toward recognizing full First Amendment protection of commercial
speech.
D. Greater New Orleans Applied StricterScrutiny but Did Not Address the
Possibility of a DiminishedStatusfor Central Hudson
Unlike 44 Liquormart, Greater New Orleans intentionally failed to

address what remained of Central Hudson after its decision. 240 44
Liquormartconsisted of many fractured opinions, each of which commonly
spoke to two issues.241 First, each Justice applied CentralHudson so as to
invalidate the regulation of commercial speech at issue under the facts of
the case.24 2 Second, and more importantly, each Justice scrutinized the
continued value and validity of the Central Hudson test. 243 While Justice

237. The Fifth Circuit ignored most of the important implications of 44 Liquormart. See
generally id.
238. See Virginia State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 765 (1976).
239. 44Liquormart,517 U.S. at 511.
240. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1930.
241. See generally 44 Liquormart,517 U.S. 484. The United States Supreme Court Justices
were unable to agree as to the proper standard that should be used to determine the validity of the
statute at issue. See id. However, the Justices agreed unanimously the statute should be struck
down under the First Amendment. See id.
242. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. 484.
243. See generally id. Justice Stevens applied the CentralHudson test strictly. See id. at
487. Justice O'Connor stated the test need not be abolished, but for the fact that it was sufficient
to strike the regulation under the facts of the case. See id. at 528, 532 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Finally, Justice Scalia stated the Central Hudson test is not ready to be struck down. See id. at
518 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Stevens and Justice Thomas criticized the Central Hudson test,244245Justice
O'Connor and Justice Scalia continued to recognize the value of it.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in 44 Liquormart, did not
reject the Central Hudson four-prong test. However, according to Justice
Thomas, Justice Stevens did drastically narrow its application.246 Focusing
on the plurality's interpretation of the fourth prong of Central Hudson,
Justice Thomas surmised no regulation of commercial speech would
survive. 247 Therefore, Justice Thomas argued commercial speech should be
placed on equal footing with non-commercial speech.24 8 Moreover, he
urged there is nothing about commercial speech that justifies greater
regulation than noncommercial speech.249 Justice Thomas also stated no
philosophical or historical basis, expressly or impliedly, asserts commercial
speech is less valuable than noncommercial speech.250
In contrast to the opinions in 44 Liquormart, the Justices writing for
the Court in Greater New Orleans intentionally declined to acknowledge
that case precedent radically narrowed the CentralHudson test. 25 1 Writing
for the majority in Greater New Orleans, Justice Stevens recognized the
opinions in 44 Liquormart seriously drew into question the merits of
Central Hudson, but the Court nonetheless declined to overrule it. Justice
Stevens found it to be "an established part of [the Court's] constitutional
jurisprudence... [to] not ordinarily reach out to make novel or
244. See generally 44 Liquormart,517 U.S. at 518-24 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
245. See id. at 532. Justice O'Connor stated the Central Hudson test should not be rejected
because its application would reject the regulation at issue. See id. at 528-32 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice O'Connor stated, "I would resolve this case more narrowly, however, by
applying our established Central Hudson test to determine whether this commercial speech
regulation survives the First Amendment scrutiny." See id. at 528. Justice Scalia stated:
Since I do not believe we have before us the wherewithal to declare Central
Hudson wrong-or at least the wherewithal to say what ought to replace it-I must
resolve this case in accord with our existing jurisprudence.... I am not disposed to
develop new law, or reinforce old, on this issue, and accordingly I merely concur in
the judgment of the Court.
Id. at 518 (Scalia, J., concurring).
246. See id. at 524 (Thomas, J., concurring).
247. See id. at 524.
248. See id. at 522-23.
249. See id. at 522. Justice Thomas stated:
I do not join the principal opinion's application of the Central Hudson balancing
test because I do not believe that such a test should be applied to a restriction of
'commercial' speech, at least when, as here, the asserted interest is one that is to be
achieved through keeping would-be recipients of the speech in the dark ...This
contradicts Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy's rationale for protecting 'commercial'
speech in the first instance.
Id. at 523.
250. See id. at 522.
251. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1930.
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unnecessarily broad pronouncements on constitutional
issues when a case
252
can be fully resolved on a narrower ground.,
Therefore, the Greater New Orleans Court consciously exercised
judicial restraint and failed to end the debate over the validity of the
CentralHudson test.253 The Court made certain not to tread on new ground
and steered clear of answering any questions 44 Liquormart had left
25 4
unanswered regarding the continued validity of the Central Hudson test.

While the 44 Liquonnart court took a significant step toward rejecting the
Central Hudson test completely, the Greater New Orleans Court should
have taken the final step. However, the Court was not prepared to do so
and it alternatively applied the Central Hudson test with heightened
scrutiny, evading the more difficult issue of determining the test's current
status.255 It is foreseeable that the Court could expressly overrule Central
Hudson in the future, and grant equal levels of protection for commercial
speech and non-commercial speech under the First Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION

Justice Stevens, in Greater New Orleans, wrote that it was
unnecessary to strike down the Central Hudson test because it was a
sufficient basis upon which to reject § 1304.256 As a result, if an analysis
under Central Hudson were to have led the GreaterNew Orleans Court to
uphold the regulation, the Supreme Court might have rejected the test and
developed new principles within the First Amendment commercial speech
doctrine.2 57 The Supreme Court should do just that. The Court should, as
suggested by Justice Thomas in 44 Liquormart,258 realize the fourth prong
of the Central Hudson test may always lead courts to strike down

252. Id.
253. See id.
254. See id. The Court clearly did not want to apply the Central Hudson test broadly. See
id. The court stated "petitioners as well as certain judges, scholars, and amici curiae have
advocated repudiation of the Central Hudson standard and implementation of a more
straightforward and stringent test for assessing the validity of governmental restrictions on
commercial speech." Id.
255. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1930.
256. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. _,
119 S. Ct. 1923,
1930 (1999).
257. See id. Justice Stevens stated "there is no need to break new ground. CentralHudson,
as applied in our more recent commercial speech cases, provides an adequate basis for decision."
Id. Accordingly, Justice Stevens probably would have broken new ground if application of the
CentralHudson test did not strike down 18 U.S.C. § 1304.
258. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 524 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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regulations on commercial speech as unconstitutional because less speechrestrictive ways to achieve the government's asserted interest in regulating
speech will surely exist. Thus, the Court should overrule Central Hudson
and place commercial speech on equal footing with noncommercial speech.
Then, commercial speech would be protected at an appropriate level and
the principles identified by the Virginia State Board Court will be fully
recognized. People will no longer be left in the dark by government.
Rather, they will be able to make well-informed decisions. These decisions
will not only be informed by non-commercial speech, but by commercial
speech as well. Only the nine Justices of the United States Supreme Court
can decide whether this final step will be259taken. However, one idea appears
to remain certain: "Old ideas die hard.,
FaraBlecker*

259. Melillo, supra note 1, at 20.
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